Zhuge Liang’s The Way of the General: 12 Principles of Leadership

Zhuge Liang’s The Way of the General has received comparatively little attention in the English-speaking world.  Zhuge Liang first caught my attention as a writer in the introduction to Thomas Cleary’s excellent edition of the Art of War (made more valuable by the commentaries it contains by subsequent strategists).  Of all of the strategic classics, Sun Tzu’s Art of War has always stood out for me as the incomparable embodiment of the spirit of strategic understanding, alongside the Tao Teh Ching with which it should always be read.  I am ready to add a third work to the list. 

“In stillness be as quiet as a fish in the deep, in action be as swift as an otter.”

Zhuge Liang’s biography is far too hefty a project to tackle here.  Polymath, itinerant scholar, strategist, alliance-builder, regent, inventor, the list of the man’s talents seems endless.  That they were buttressed by what could be considered a soft touch and the humility of an open mind gives Zhuge Liang a lasting charm that contrasts well with the grasping hard-headedness that has led many military and political strategists to unfortunate fates.  And yet, the man was revered as one of the most successful politicians and strategists of the Three Kingdoms Period, one of the most tumultuous eras in Chinese history.

The Taoist themes in Zhuge Liang’s thought are timeless, translating very well to any area of leadership in any century.  Though he was a skilled military tactician, The Way of the General gives only the smallest hints as to battlefield tactics and strategy.  “Press enemies and contain them; lure and entice them. Confuse them and seize them; be humble to make them proud. Be familiar yet distant; weaken them by lending strength.”  And perhaps that is the point.  With effective leadership, tactics come easily.  Or, as he might say, “First organise the inner, then organise the outer.  First organise yourself, then organise others.”

A few of the strongest themes from The Way of the General:



1. The leaders must know everything about those who serve under them; hold no order of people in contempt.

“An ancient document says: “Those who are contemptuous of cultured people have no way to win people’s hearts completely; those who are contemptuous of common people have no way to get people to work as hard as they can.

“[The enlightened ruler] worries not about subordinates not knowing superiors, but about superiors not knowing subordinates. He worries not about the lower classes not knowing the upper classes, but about the upper classes not knowing the lower classes.

“Thus when you are alert to what the people in the lower echelons have to say, and take it into consideration, so that your plan include the rank and file, then all people are your eyes and a multitude of voices helps your ears.”



2. Find out the talents of your subordinates and give them the opportunity to make them count.

Appropriate use of talent is one of Zhuge’s strongest themes.  He suggests organising an army by the talents of the soldiers rather than by a preconceived structure, forming elite units for melee combat, charges, speed, horse archery, marksmanship and so on, thus giving everyone scope to use their strengths in battle.  Zhuge Liang also provides guidelines for finding able leaders at various levels.

“One who is direct yet circumspect, who is brave and can fight, is the leader of a thousand men.

“One of martial bearing and fierceness of heart, who knows the hardships of others and spares people from hunger and cold, is the leader of ten thousand men.

“One who associates with the wise and promotes the able, who is careful of how he spends each day, who is sincere, trustworthy, and magnanimous, and who is guarded in times of order as well as times of disturbance, is the leader of a hundred thousand men.

“One whose humanitarian care extends to all under his command, whose trustworthiness and justice win the allegiance of neighboring nations, who understands the signs of the sky above, the patterns of the earth below, and the affairs of humanity in between, and who regards all people as his family, is a world-class leader, one who cannot be opposed.”




3. Win the people over by righteousness and care for their needs.

This one seems almost strange today, when we almost without exception expect our leaders to be looking out for number one and any show of sympathy with the people to be little more than convention. 

“Give security to those in danger; gladden those in fear. If people oppose you, take what they say to heart; if people have grudges, let them express themselves.

“Restrain the strong, sustain the weak.

“Good generals of ancient times took care of their people as one might take care of a beloved child. When there was difficulty they would face it first themselves, and when something was achieved they would defer to others. They would tearfully console the wounded and sorrowfully mourn the dead. They would sacrifice themselves to feed the hungry and remove their own garments to clothe the cold. They honored the wise and provided for their living; they rewarded and encouraged the brave. If generals can be like this, they can take over anywhere they go.”




4. Share your subordinates’ conditions.

This was more than words for Zhuge Liang, whose will reflects that although he gained some lands for the support of his family, he himself lived and was fed and clothed little better than the soldiers.  If the leader lives in luxury, the subordinates will have little affection for him; he will be the fat cat playing with their lives and fortunes rather than a respected comrade.  Zhuge’s insistence that a general not eat before his soldiers and that he share their risks is particularly apt today in the world of unearned bonuses and golden parachutes for certain classes of people and pay cuts and layoffs for those less well-off.

“Do not sit down before the soldiers sit; do not eat before the soldiers eat.

“Bear the same cold and heat the soldiers do; share their toil as well as their case.

“Experience sweetness and bitterness just as the soldiers do; take the same risks that they do.

“Then the soldiers will exert themselves to the utmost, and it will be possible to destroy enemies.”

“According to the code of generalship, generals do not say they are thirsty before the soldiers have drawn from the well; generals do not say they are hungry before the soldiers’ food is cooked; generals do not say they are cold before the soldiers’ fire are kindled; generals do not say they are hot before the soldiers’ canopies are drawn. Generals do not use fans in summer, do not wear leather (or fur) in winter, do not use umbrella in the rain. They do as everyone does.”




5. Exercise vigilance, expecting every condition to contain the seeds of its opposite, according to the Tao.

In Taoism, every benefit may contain the seeds of future harm.  Lao Tzu’s comments on overextension leading to decay come to mind here, as do his comments about the ease of dealing with the seed compared with the grown plant.  It is no good achieving victory in a way that embitters a population you have to deal with.  It is no good passing laws to maintain order that tarnish the reputation of the state and lead to further disorder.  It is no good posting record profits if your long-term strategy is unsound.

“Danger arises in safety, destruction arises in survival. Harm arises in advantage, chaos arises in order.”




6. Punishment and reward must be absolutely consistent and never subject to personal motives.

The consistency of rewards and punishments, for Zhuge as for Mozi, should be clear and absolutely without personal bias, since this is the only way to encourage achievement and cultivate order.

“If they get angry without discernible reason, their authority will not be effective. If their rewards and punishments are not clear, the lower echelons will not be encouraged to achieve.

“If politics are inappropriate, orders will not be obeyed. If private affairs are carried over into public life, people will be of two minds.

“If rewards are given for no reason, those who have worked hard in public service will be resentful; if penalties are applied arbitrary, upright people will be bitter.”




7. In order to solve a problem or improve organisation, start at the top.

Everything starts with the leader, who will get exactly the organisation he deserves.  Every big problem starts at the top.  If the great are not properly ordered, neither will their subordinates be.

“First organize the near at hand, then organize the far removed. First organize the inner, then organize the outer. First organize the basic, then organize the derivative. First organize the strong, then organize the weak. First organize the great, then organize the small. First organize yourself, then organize others.”




8. Educate subordinates by your example.

“A policy of instruction and direction means those above educate those below, not saying anything that is unlawful and not doing anything that is immoral, for what is done by those above is observed by those below.”



9. For important jobs, seek out hidden talent in obscure places.

Zhuge Liang’s own beginnings as an itinerant scholar are reflected in the value he places on people of obscure origins who may not have had a chance to show their skills.  Most human potential is wasted; being able to find it and use it correctly is the key skill of exceptional leaders.

“Straight trees are found in remote forests; upright people come from the humble masses. Therefore when rulers are going to make appointments they need to look in obscure places.

“Sometimes there are disenfranchised people with something of value in them; sometimes there are people with extraordinary talent who go unrecognized. Sometimes there are paragons of virtue who are not promoted by their hometown; sometimes there are people who live in obscurity on purpose.”

“Sometimes there are people who are dutiful and righteous for purely philosophical or religious reasons. Sometimes there are loyal people who are straightforward with rulers but are slandered by cliques. Ancient kings are known to have hired unknowns and nobodies, finding in them the human qualities whereby they were able to bring peace.”




10. Lighten your subordinates’ burdens, be concerned for their welfare and give them a chance to thrive.

“Encourage people in productive work, don’t deprive them of their time. Lighten their taxes, don’t exhaust their resources. In this way the country is made wealthy and families secure.”




11. Reward generously.

“ [A] General should not be stingy, for if they are stingy they will not reward the trustworthy, and if they do not reward the trustworthy, the soldiers will not be dedicated., the armed forces are ineffective, and if the armed forces are ineffective, the nation is empty. When the nation is empty, its opponents are full.”




12. To Avoid:

Zhuge Liang spends a great deal of time listing everything that leaders should avoid, and that righteous leaders should punish in their officials.  His list of the eight evils of generals is particularly instructive.  Inability to formulate strategy in a moral way is the worst evil, the inability to delegate authority to men of peace in peacetime the second worst.  The inability to foresee and prevent future dangers through wise policy features twice on the list.  A second list deals with decadence in generals, beginning with greed.

Zhuge Liang also emphasises the importance of dismissing corrupt and unjust officials as well as those whose excessive meddling and bureaucracy causes the people hardship and confusion.




It is notable that Zhuge Liang remains a key standard by which officials, and especially Premiers, are still measured in China.  Wen Jiabao, sincerely or not, very much played up to this image and in so doing probably did more than anyone else to keep the Party-State stable. 

If there is one work on leadership that everyone should read, this is it.  It is much shorter and easier to read than the Art of War, appropriately demanding and very clear, and despite the title, it translates quite easily into non-military affairs, spending little time on concerns exclusive to generalship. 



All quotations from Kong Ming's Archives, translation by Thomas Cleary

China in the South Sea Islands: Pride Goeth

This article was written just before the recent announcement by China of its intention to garrison the Paracel Islands, and should be read accordingly. 

When island standoffs come once every few weeks, and the grounding of Chinese frigates on disputed shoals is the expected order of the day, the question “Why the heck does anyone care?” moves to the forefront of the minds of most reasonable observers.  What the Spratleys or the Paracels actually represent to China’s foreign policy from an internal perspective is a question comparatively ignored.   Of course, answers of a sort to both questions are quick to hand.  Resources, national prestige.  But what does that really mean? 

Is the CCP so worried about the vulnerability of their energy supplies, not to mention future shortfalls as development continues, that they are consciously risking the very considerable goodwill they had amassed in the past decade of Chiang Mai currency swaps, the China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement and a carefully-strategized soft-power offensive on the geostrategic necessity of finding abundant, proximate oil and gas resources?  There is reason to believe that China is deeply concerned about the vulnerability of its African oil supply to disruption en route through the Indian Ocean and the Malacca Straits.  Further, the CCP has known for over a decade that it will have to dampen consumption levels and invest in sustainable technologies or risk outstripping the conceivable energy (and other) supplies available to them.  However, it is quite likely that they have a few years left to go before that wall is in sight. 

As for national prestige, East Asia is home to quite a number of ongoing territorial disputes, both maritime and continental, and China is involved in quite a few of them, yet life has somehow gone on without any hint of resolution.  It could be that what China might have seen as pre-emptive actions in the region- notably Vietnam’s threat last year to grant oil concessions in the Spratleys- required a countervailing assertiveness for home consumption, and that the issue has snowballed.  If this were the case, we could expect China to look for an opportunity to cool the issue down.

Why didn’t the recent ASEAN meeting show any sign of this?  China wants all of these issues to be negotiated on a strictly bilateral basis.  China has historically been quite careful about the limitations it might incur through multilateral commitments, and ASEAN can be said to bear much of the credit for acculturating China to the many multilateral organisations it has joined in the last decade.  In the end, however, the strain of caution remains, and China may well see multilateral negotiation as a dangerous gamble particularly here, where they would have to be seen to play by ASEAN rules in the best case, and in the worst case the United States might try to muscle in as it already has.  Unfortunately, many ASEAN countries seem to have been driven beyond the point where the status quo is considered acceptable.  The issue is live, and China may not be able to defuse it.

That is one interpretation.  Another is that the CCP has yet again done too good a job substituting nationalism for Maoism.  This has got it into trouble before.  Widespread protests erupted within China in 2005 over Japan’s bid for a Security Council seat, and were immediately suppressed by an embarrassed Communist Party.  It could be that popular opinion has swung through China Emergent all the way to China Triumphant.  The tone of Chinese military rhetoric and building programs certainly suggests something of the kind.  If so, then the secret fear of many China observers could come to pass: that a situation might develop in which the Chinese Communist Party feels that it cannot defy nationalist sentiment in the name of reason and will abandon its long policy of conflict containment in order to survive politically. 

By far the worst case scenario is that the Party leadership, having decided  that it cannot or will not clean up the internal corruption, political and labour scandals which have led to a constant, exponential annual increase in public protest since the 1990s, actually views these events as a useful distraction.  This is the worst case, not because the Party is stirring up conflict as a distraction a la General Galtieri in the Falklands, but because if it has truly thrown in the towel and given into another generation of corruption under the Party “princelings” (and the structure of the new leadership suggests that possibility) then China surely is headed for a different kind of wall, a political wall in addition to a resource wall.  It will surely take others with it.

In any case, whatever the scenario we entertain, the significance of the island disputes is not in the disputes themselves- but that does not mean they are not significant.  Every scenario points to the same choice.  If China doesn’t find the will and the means to cool things off (and no one but China can), China may find itself crashing right through all its rhetoric of “peaceful rise” and all of its hard-won trust in the region.  China can be either the nationalist bully, or the conciliatory regional power- but the choice is in play. 

When this article was first written, it concluded with the words “Hang on to your hats.”  Little did it appear how apt that advice might be.  The decision to garrison the Paracels comes after the installation of a municipal government for the islands’ sparse population, and announcements regarding the development of tourism and natural resources.  By themselves, any of these could be seen as diplomatic manoeuvres, and the garrisoning of the islands, which were captured from South Vietnam in 1974, is not an entirely surprising extension of China’s military presence in the group.  Taken together, however, all of these things indicate a disturbing assurance on the part of China that it can make a disputed island group its own simply by behaving as though it were.  China either does not expect anyone to muster the force or the will to effectively contest such a policy, or wishes for such an incident in order to demonstrate the futility of any resistance to its territorial boxes. 

Regardless of the military fact that China can indisputably win any conflict up to a regional war with any or all Southeast Asian countries, in either case, it is making a serious mistake.  Even if everyone backs down, the results would undoubtedly polarise the region, and even if no one wanted to risk open conflict, this would be a definitive end to the friendly face of China’s rise, and the beginning of a path that might ultimately lead to a confrontation involving the United States, something that could not fail to be disastrous for everyone involved.

Strategikon of Maurice: The Praxis of Leadership and the Art of War

The Strategikon of the Emperor Maurice (582-602) is one of several valuable repositories of military strategy left to us by the Byzantine (properly East Roman)  Empire, not only because of the unique window it provides into the military organisation of the Empire

Background

Following the collapse of the Western Empire, the Byzantines adjusted every aspect of military strategy and tactics to cope with the harsh lessons inflicted by the various invading tribes.  The army assimilated the best of the tactics used by their opponents, the Huns, Goths, Scythians and Persians among others.  They incorporated disciplined mobile cavalry tactics, as well as heavily-armoured cavalry or kataphracts.  In an era in which Western Europe and its nascent feudal system were descending into internecine warfare among rival barons, Byzantium maintained one of Europe’s few remaining non-mercenary professional armies with meaningful uniformity of training and tactics and systematic organisation.  The tactics of the Byzantine armies were quite successful in defending the empire against the primarily Arab, Bulgarian and Turkish invaders throughout long stretches of the Isaurian, Macedonian and Komnenian dynasties.  Situated at the pivot between Europe and Asia Minor, Byzantium’s successes in containing the early Islamic invasions ranks with the Mongol succession crisis in their importance for the formation of Europe as we know it.

Praxis of Strategy

If Sun Tzu’s Art of War emphasized strategic mindset with tactical annotations, then Maurice wrote extensively about how to carry a strategy into practice.  The Strategikon is essentially a handbook for generals, a step-by-step treatment of the raising, training, logistics, formations, discipline, equipment, formations, battle tactics and strategic calculus of the Byzantine armies.  It is exactly this comprehensive and methodical approach that sets Maurice in the tradition of the armies of Marius and Caesar in an age in which most of Europe’s “armies” consisted of nobles, who frequently fought one another and were occasionally brought together by an outside threat, and peasants with minimal military training. 

More importantly for our purposes, it encapsulates principles of leadership and strategy that translate very well through the centuries.

Useful Points of Strategy: Books VII and VIII

 

Books VII and VIII of the Strategikon bear the most directly on strategy as such, though strategic thought is evident throughout the book.  Book VIII, “General Instructions and Maxims,” is one of the great unsung works on leadership, and should be read right along with the Art of War by every aspiring leader in any field.  Maurice has extremely high standards for military leadership, and much of what he says is surprisingly reminiscent of the best advice of successful business, military, political and social leaders of modern times.


     1. The Art of Change

One feature that all of the really great strategists from Sun Tzu down through history have had in common is an emphasis on adapting one’s own approach to neutralise the enemy’s advantages and multiply his weaknesses in an almost automatic way.  Entire martial arts are formed around this principle: deal with incoming energy through its equal and opposite.  Emperor Maurice is a master of this strategy.

• Whatever the enemy’s strength may be, make it a weakness.  If his strength is numbers, attack his supplies.  If it is cavalry, attack in late winter when their horses are in their worst condition. 

• Use the enemy’s existing weaknesses.  Multiply dissentions and corruption within their ranks.  If they are undisciplined, make as though to attack and wait for them to grow restless.

• “A good general is one who utilizes his own skills to fit the opportunities he gets and the quality of the enemy.”

• If your force is small, select a narrow place in which to fight, thus reducing the enemy’s advantage and avoiding being outflanked.

• If the enemy relies on archers, attack when their bowstrings are wet with rain.

• Adapt your strategy to the disposition of the enemy general.  If he is a rash, hard-charging type, provoke him.  If he is careful and reserved, pick at him using surprise raids, and so on.

• Choose your terrain according to the enemy’s weakness.  Fight in the woods if he is best at fighting on the plains, plains if he prefers fighting in the mountains, and so on.  To this end, Maurice insists that even the horses be trained to manoeuvre on rough and hilly ground.

2. Logistics and Supply

Maurice is meticulous about the logistical foundations of power, down to the food carried in his troops’ saddlebags.  He dedicates an entire book to the subject, and even in these two chapters, he enjoins his commanders to study the means of poisoning enemy food supplies while protecting their own, to make sure that horses are watered before battle, to store hay for horses during wars of cavalry against cavalry and many other points of preparation.  His main concern in Book VII is that the army provides itself with enough of a reserve that it can rebound from a defeat or carry the war forward if an opportunity arises.

By the same token, it is better to starve the enemy of resources than to meet him in pitched battle.

3. Gathering Intelligence

Maurice emphasises the gathering of intelligence.  Continuous scouting, patrols and even the use of spies and the seduction of defectors are all within his repertoire.  He even issues particular instructions on what to do when confronted by an unfamiliar and powerful enemy, advising his commanders to engage in small-scale raids first to determine their methods of war and build confidence on the Byzantine side. 

4. Concealment and Deception

Maurice puts every effort into making sure that the number and disposition of his own forces are not seen until the last minute, with units moving separately from one another so that they cannot be seen at the same time, sending out ambush parties and larger units to prevent enemy reconnaissance, and even hiding in the woods until the enemy is very close.  The one exception is if a spy is caught and the army happens to be strong and in excellent condition, in which case the spy is to be released to go back and deliver to the enemy news of their inferiority.

Maurice proposes sending false messages and rumours with the intention of their being intercepted by the enemy, as well as feints and deceptive tactics.  His strategy to decoy a pursuing enemy is utter simplicity: start a fire in one place and move off in another direction.  The enemy will head for the fire.

Because armies in this period knew very well that a parade-ready army is never battle-ready, they tended overtly to judge an army’s fighting ability by the dullness of its appearance.  Maurice advises measures to appear as dull as possible until the moment of battle, and thus intimidate the enemy.

5. Spiritual Fortification

• “Before getting into danger, the general should worship God.  When he does get into danger, then, he can with confidence pray to God as a friend.”

• The troops are to sing prayers morning and evening, and the banners to be blessed before battle.

• Besides these overt manifestations of spiritual activity, Maurice emphasises the spiritual and psychological advantage that comes with making war only for just causes, settling wars with diplomacy where the enemy will be easily satisfied, and behaving, by Byzantine standards, honourably toward the enemy, regardless of the enemy’s own behaviour.

6. Leadership

The Troops: Lead, Don’t Manage

• “The spirit of the commander is naturally communicated to the troops.”  Maurice recognises that the army is only as good as its general, and that each general creates the army he deserves by his attitude, disposition and conduct.  A general must be “calm in emergencies, prudent in counsel, courteous to his associates.” 

• Maurice quotes a saying that “it is better to have an army of deer commanded by a lion than an army of lions commanded by a deer.”  For this reason, the general should present a cheerful and unflappable appearance regardless of the situation.  Also, a general must set an example by his behaviour “training himself to the highest ideals... and refraining from those things his soldiers should refrain from.”

• “...the general ought not to set himself apart... but he should begin the work and toil along with his troops as much as possible.  Such behaviour will lead the soldier to be more submissive to his officers, even if only out of shame, and he will accomplish more.”

• “The general’s way of life should be plain and simple, like that of his soldiers.”  Nothing, Maurice writes, is more destructive to an army than a general who likes to live in luxury, as the men will look at the discrepancy between their hardship and the general’s ease and will become corrupt and unscrupulous.

•  A general should behave in a “fatherly” way toward his troops, “give orders in a mild manner,” “give advice and discuss essential matters with them in person.”  He should be concerned with “their safety, their food and their regular pay.”

• The general must take every measure possible to increase his troops’ confidence and raise their spirits, regardless of reversals.

• Assign people to duties in which they will succeed.  Assign cowards and weak officers to rear-echelon duties, and honest and able men to responsible positions, as scouts and line officers.  Test the courage of your men before taking them into battle, and if you see their courage failing, take measures to build up their confidence one skill at a time.

• Real motivation comes from expectation of success and rewards, not from fear of punishment.  Fear leads to hatred, and severe punishments to mutiny.

• The general must be seen to be a fair and impartial judge in all cases, even between his own people and allies.  He must investigate thoroughly and punish mercifully.

• Take proper care of the wounded and the dead, or the army will not fight well.


Responsible Leadership:

• A general should “see that civilians are left unharmed.”  Maurice’s regulations are quite strict about any harm done to the property of a Roman citizen.  This implies that the leader must take responsibility for the broader impact of his organisation on the people and society.

• Take time making plans.  Once you have made a decision, carry it out immediately.

• Gravitas: avoid undue elation and depression.

• A general should take habitual precautions, such as making fortified camps, even when he thinks he is safe; too many military and political leaders in recent memory have given the excuse that Maurice tells a general not to give: we didn’t expect it.  A general is responsible for expecting any reasonably foreseeable reversal.

• There are rules in war for a reason.  Treat enemy envoys well, and keep sworn agreements.  If both sides can agree on these principles, they can function to the advantage of both.  Betray them, and they’re closed forever.

• Every night, a general should think about his mistakes and omissions of the day, and what he will do to correct them the next day.


The Path of the General:

• “The best general is not the man of noble family, but the man who can take pride in his own deeds.”

• “A general who desires peace must prepare for war.”

• Change up your tactics, especially when they have been working for some time.

• Failing to study the enemy and the possibilities for reversal on the battlefield is the sign of an inept and amateurish general.

Points of Interest:

Maurice was a great believer in tactics, strategy and careful preparation over raw daring or overwhelming force, and thus his attention was focussed on developing leaders who were proficient in such an approach.  “Wild animals,” he writes, “are taken by scouting, by nets, by lying in wait, by stalking, by circling around, and by other such strategems rather than by sheer force.”

There are traces everywhere throughout the Strategikon of the painful lessons dealt to the Roman Army by the barbarians in the period we now call Late Antiquity.  Maurice’s injunction never to let barbarian allies camp with, get to close to or learn the tactics of the Byzantine Army shows the marks of a very costly lesson well-learned.  Likewise, he specifically enjoins careful training of the cavalry and advocates a force consisting mainly of cavalry.


More on the Strategikon later.

 

Principles of Strategy in Action: The Theban Rise

Principles:

Improve the lot of those your enemy has oppressed.

Provide leadership where your enemy has failed to do so.

Understand the motives and desires of your allies.

After the Peloponnesian Wars, both Athens and Sparta were exhausted.  Sparta attempted to install oligarchies on their own model throughout Greece, without bothering to be in any way tactful or persuasive, or to realise that their allies had supported them because of Athenian meddling and Sparta’s history of minding its own business.  This naturally led to widespread discontent.

The city of Thebes at this time was becoming more democratic.  Sparta, accustomed to viewing democracy as a threat, immediately attempted to interfere, which only succeeded in creating a groundswell of democratic feeling in Thebes.  In response, the Thebans began to develop an army rivalling that of Sparta.

In the ensuing war, the Thebans under the general Epaminondus displayed a brilliant grasp of Sparta’s strategic failings.  They recognised that Sparta had a pattern of exposing its allies to greater risk than it was willing to take itself.  If you joined the Spartans in battle, you would end up facing the brunt of the enemy attack on the left wing while the Spartans on the right triumphed easily over the less formidable of the enemy troops, thus retaining their reputation for invincibility and conserving their numbers.  The Thebans, on the other hand, took the left wing position in their formation, ensuring that they would meet the Spartans directly, thus proving their willingness to lead from the front. 

Also, the Thebans realised that anyone who wanted to defeat Sparta had a tremendous potential ally within Sparta itself- the Helots.  The Helots were the descendants of the conquered Messenians, who had been subjugated to support the Spartan warrior class.  The Spartans had done nothing to assimilate the Helots into their society- indeed, every year they ritually declared war on the Helot population and routinely killed off any Helot who managed to gain any pre-eminence.  The Helots were only kept in check by the warrior skill of the small population of Spartan Equals, already severely depleted in numbers by the Peloponnesian Wars and were in no position to fight two wars at the same time. 

The Thebans did the logical thing, declaring that the Helots would be returned to the status of free Greeks like their Messenian ancestors.  The reaction was predictable and immediate, and from that moment, Sparta’s war became unwinnable and its economic foundation of slave labour was ripped out from under it.  It would spend the next several centuries as a kind of theme park for visitors wanting to gawp at what had once been the Mediterranean’s pre-eminent warrior culture.

Links of Interest- Leadership, Languages and Lacklustre Fighters

Found an interesting talk by the USAF's first female Thunderbird pilot (and later F-15E Squadron Commander) Lt. Col. Nicole Malachowski, on life in the Thunderbirds and her experiences as a female fighter pilot.  She offers a worthwhile career strategy toward the end- give your time only to positive people.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v0jZnTf-MIg


As a fervent enthsiast of the world's lesser-known languages and cultures, Google's Endangered Languages Project and its stated goal of protecting "global lingistic diversity" has a basic appeal- if only it had some content.


For anyone following the F-35 controversy in any of the many countries whose defence budgets are about to be hit by this incredibly expensive machine, here is a documentary interviewing Pierre Sprey, the man behind the A-10 and the F-16, explaining the airplane's tactical, budgetary and logistical shortcomings. 

As a Canadian, I find it particularly frustrating that commentators in this country are divided mainly along political lines.  The Left is sure that we don't need it but can't explain why, thus coming across as kneejerk doves, as always.  The Right is sure that we do need it, yet their given reasons are incredibly flimsy, and the doctrine against which the purchase is set should certainly be a matter of concern to the nation (more on all of this later).  This documentary would make an excellent benchmark for informed discourse on the subject... well, hope springs eternal.

In related news, the Netherlands' Parliament may be about to ditch their F-35 order.