Whether the United States “won” the Cold War by spending the
USSR into the ground, or whether it was won for them by the great awakening
that spread across Eastern Europe in the 1980s is a matter of continuing debate;
that the end of the Cold War was a complete shock to exactly that group of
scholars which now embraces the former theory is not. Whichever the case, one thing that is clear
in retrospect about that historical moment is that the United States and its
European allies failed to secure the peace as well as they should have.
By now, we are all used to seeing the weekly
Russian-American spat. Yes, there are
historical and psychological factors behind this, going back as far as Ivan the
Terrible, who taught his successors to unite Russia through fear of the
West. And yes, Putin is a masterful
manipulator of this psychological tendency.
But the West made it easy. How
many Russians after the humiliating decline and poverty of the 1990s looked
back to the Soviet Union with nostalgia, the good old days when poverty at
least had a defined bottom? And how easy
to blame the change on the West, which gained everything by Russia’s decline
and no doubt stood by laughing. And
then, how tempting to look back on the military might of the Soviet Union and
think, “They were afraid of us then!”
From there, militarisation and nationalist bellicosity
become embedded in Russian politics, and with them the price that Ivan the
Terrible and Peter the Great and Lenin and Stalin have all taught their people
to accept: a strong boss at the top of a strong state which will tax the people
in order to defend them and spy on them and repress undesirable elements in
order to keep them safe.
Could this regression have been prevented? Could the West have prevented it? No one can answer that question. But the West certainly could have done more. Consider the following scenario.
In the early 1990s, after the fall of the Union, American
economic advisors were sent to advise Russia on how to manage the transition to
capitalism. From the perspective of
these advisors, the Russian political establishment was so caught up in its
internal problems that it implemented their advice haphazardly and
clumsily. From the Russian perspective,
the Americans were suspect representatives of a foreign ideology who gave a lot
of advice and did little besides.
Suppose the United States had sent a high-level envoy to
Russia with a whole package of economic incentives, including trade concessions
and widespread industrial collaboration.
Many Russian industries which simply could not compete on an open market
could have been easily updated through industrial partnerships rather than sold
off in bulk to corrupt predators. Above
all, the United States should have tried to sustain the existing economic
structure, and advised the Yeltsin government to do so, until it could be
consciously and carefully privatised, rather than the disastrously rapid
sell-off that actually occurred. The
concessions on offer would have been the guarantee of the government’s
attention.
The United States, realising that Russia’s massive military
industrial complex represented its only sound manufacturing industry and that
it could easily represent a threat to the peace if left to itself, could have
invested in industrial partnerships designed to convert large parts of this
sector to civilian use, giving Russia the incentive of access to up-to-date
computers and electronics. The remainder
of this sector could have been safely sustained by giving it US defence
contracts (in partnership with US firms).
This would have benefitted the US military enormously by giving them
cheap access to the systems they are most likely to face in future conflicts,
as well as advances in areas such as ground-based surface-to-air and supersonic
anti-ship missiles, artillery and so on in which the United States has always
lagged behind. Imagine a defence
establishment with the insight to redirect the billions of dollars wasted in
the past two decades on cancelled and overbudget programs into partnerships
with Russian industry, which had the foresight to buy Su-30s to supplement the
USAF’s ageing F-15 fleet, which bought Sovremenny-class destroyers before China
could get to them, which for a fraction of today’s defence budget had unlimited
access to cheap, highly-effective systems.
Russia would gain access to the world’s biggest defence market, all for
the low, low price of first crack at every product they made and the occasional
under-the-table veto of a purchase to a hostile country.
All of the above could have meant that American aid dollars,
rather than doping the Russian economy, could have been used to sustain it
until it reached profitability. Even if
the project failed (and since trying to keep a lid on Yeltsin, let alone his
various governments, would at best have been an exercise in bull-riding, it
very likely would have), the United States could have bought itself enormous
capital, and given Russia enormous face, by placing such importance in the
project. Blame for any failure would
have more than likely landed in Yeltsin’s lap, as long as the US were smart
enough to make a point of deferring to him on a regular basis.
Face is the important quantity here. Russia’s abiding inferiority/superiority
complex is one of the more prominent and remarked-upon aspects of its national
character. The country that built the
world’s biggest submarine, biggest nuclear-powered cruiser, biggest ICBM, biggest
strategic rocket force and biggest bomber has a burning need to be recognised
as an equal among equals, to be respected. That is precisely what it did not
feel during the 1990s, and it is that omission for which we are now paying.
As for Europe, giving Russia face could have been as simple
as an offer of access to the Internal Market, probably combined with an intimation
that EU membership was a future possibility.
Of course, very little of the above would have been
politically possible. Asking the US Congress
to abandon pork-barrel politics long enough to place major defence orders
overseas, asking the US to actually build up an economic competitor, asking
France and Germany to risk adding Russia to the list of their competitors for
EU leadership- it’s all quite impossible.
So, you may ask, what is the point of this indulgence in counterfactual
history if it couldn’t have happened?
The point is that the sort of strategic short-sightedness
demonstrated by the United States in its relationship with Russia arises from
the same political defects that continue to diminish its position in the world
today. Anyone remember the Asian
Financial Crisis back at the turn of the millennium? That was America’s golden opportunity to make
friends in Asia. The US wasn’t paying
attention, and it was China that swooped in and bailed out its neighbours, gaining
very substantial goodwill and laying the groundwork for the China-ASEAN Free
Trade Agreement. That agreement came
about because China was willing to make substantial unilateral economic
concessions, tailored country by country, on the basis of a principle called “giving
six, taking four.” It was about the long
game.
The entire scenario spelled out above was inspired by the
strategies of the Chinese Communist Party, both in its internal economic policies
and in its so-called “Charm Offensive.”
These people are incredibly smart, enjoying the world’s oldest and most
sophisticated strategic culture, and unlike the United States political
establishment, they play the long game as a matter of habit. And yet, the West remains predisposed through
political dogma to regard the Party as a relic, an impediment to China’s
progress, rather than the architect thereof.
All that the Party needs to continue winning in international politics is
to continue being underestimated. It has
found a basic weakness of the American system, and is both exploiting it
directly, and profiting by the fruits of it- the Sino-Russian arms relationship
has been a prime example. So long as the
United States lacks the political will to address the strategic shortcomings of
its current lucre-greased electoral system, any great power lacking that
liability will be able to exploit it.
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