Background
Following the collapse of the Western Empire, the Byzantines adjusted every aspect of military strategy and tactics to cope with the harsh lessons inflicted by the various invading tribes. The army assimilated the best of the tactics used by their opponents, the Huns, Goths, Scythians and Persians among others. They incorporated disciplined mobile cavalry tactics, as well as heavily-armoured cavalry or kataphracts. In an era in which Western Europe and its nascent feudal system were descending into internecine warfare among rival barons, Byzantium maintained one of Europe’s few remaining non-mercenary professional armies with meaningful uniformity of training and tactics and systematic organisation. The tactics of the Byzantine armies were quite successful in defending the empire against the primarily Arab, Bulgarian and Turkish invaders throughout long stretches of the Isaurian, Macedonian and Komnenian dynasties. Situated at the pivot between Europe and Asia Minor, Byzantium’s successes in containing the early Islamic invasions ranks with the Mongol succession crisis in their importance for the formation of Europe as we know it.
Praxis of Strategy
If Sun Tzu’s Art of War emphasized strategic mindset with tactical annotations, then Maurice wrote extensively about how to carry a strategy into practice. The Strategikon is essentially a handbook for generals, a step-by-step treatment of the raising, training, logistics, formations, discipline, equipment, formations, battle tactics and strategic calculus of the Byzantine armies. It is exactly this comprehensive and methodical approach that sets Maurice in the tradition of the armies of Marius and Caesar in an age in which most of Europe’s “armies” consisted of nobles, who frequently fought one another and were occasionally brought together by an outside threat, and peasants with minimal military training.
More importantly for our purposes, it encapsulates principles of leadership and strategy that translate very well through the centuries.
Useful Points of Strategy: Books VII and VIII
Books VII and VIII of the Strategikon bear the most directly on strategy as such, though strategic thought is evident throughout the book. Book VIII, “General Instructions and Maxims,” is one of the great unsung works on leadership, and should be read right along with the Art of War by every aspiring leader in any field. Maurice has extremely high standards for military leadership, and much of what he says is surprisingly reminiscent of the best advice of successful business, military, political and social leaders of modern times.
1. The Art of Change
One feature that all of the really great strategists from Sun Tzu down through history have had in common is an emphasis on adapting one’s own approach to neutralise the enemy’s advantages and multiply his weaknesses in an almost automatic way. Entire martial arts are formed around this principle: deal with incoming energy through its equal and opposite. Emperor Maurice is a master of this strategy.
• Whatever the enemy’s strength may be, make it a weakness. If his strength is numbers, attack his supplies. If it is cavalry, attack in late winter when their horses are in their worst condition.
• Use the enemy’s existing weaknesses. Multiply dissentions and corruption within their ranks. If they are undisciplined, make as though to attack and wait for them to grow restless.
• “A good general is one who utilizes his own skills to fit the opportunities he gets and the quality of the enemy.”
• If your force is small, select a narrow place in which to fight, thus reducing the enemy’s advantage and avoiding being outflanked.
• If the enemy relies on archers, attack when their bowstrings are wet with rain.
• Adapt your strategy to the disposition of the enemy general. If he is a rash, hard-charging type, provoke him. If he is careful and reserved, pick at him using surprise raids, and so on.
• Choose your terrain according to the enemy’s weakness. Fight in the woods if he is best at fighting on the plains, plains if he prefers fighting in the mountains, and so on. To this end, Maurice insists that even the horses be trained to manoeuvre on rough and hilly ground.
2. Logistics and Supply
Maurice is meticulous about the logistical foundations of power, down to the food carried in his troops’ saddlebags. He dedicates an entire book to the subject, and even in these two chapters, he enjoins his commanders to study the means of poisoning enemy food supplies while protecting their own, to make sure that horses are watered before battle, to store hay for horses during wars of cavalry against cavalry and many other points of preparation. His main concern in Book VII is that the army provides itself with enough of a reserve that it can rebound from a defeat or carry the war forward if an opportunity arises.
By the same token, it is better to starve the enemy of resources than to meet him in pitched battle.
3. Gathering Intelligence
Maurice emphasises the gathering of intelligence. Continuous scouting, patrols and even the use of spies and the seduction of defectors are all within his repertoire. He even issues particular instructions on what to do when confronted by an unfamiliar and powerful enemy, advising his commanders to engage in small-scale raids first to determine their methods of war and build confidence on the Byzantine side.
4. Concealment and Deception
Maurice puts every effort into making sure that the number and disposition of his own forces are not seen until the last minute, with units moving separately from one another so that they cannot be seen at the same time, sending out ambush parties and larger units to prevent enemy reconnaissance, and even hiding in the woods until the enemy is very close. The one exception is if a spy is caught and the army happens to be strong and in excellent condition, in which case the spy is to be released to go back and deliver to the enemy news of their inferiority.
Maurice proposes sending false messages and rumours with the intention of their being intercepted by the enemy, as well as feints and deceptive tactics. His strategy to decoy a pursuing enemy is utter simplicity: start a fire in one place and move off in another direction. The enemy will head for the fire.
Because armies in this period knew very well that a parade-ready army is never battle-ready, they tended overtly to judge an army’s fighting ability by the dullness of its appearance. Maurice advises measures to appear as dull as possible until the moment of battle, and thus intimidate the enemy.
5. Spiritual Fortification
• “Before getting into danger, the general should worship God. When he does get into danger, then, he can with confidence pray to God as a friend.”
• The troops are to sing prayers morning and evening, and the banners to be blessed before battle.
• Besides these overt manifestations of spiritual activity, Maurice emphasises the spiritual and psychological advantage that comes with making war only for just causes, settling wars with diplomacy where the enemy will be easily satisfied, and behaving, by Byzantine standards, honourably toward the enemy, regardless of the enemy’s own behaviour.
6. Leadership
The Troops: Lead, Don’t Manage
• “The spirit of the commander is naturally communicated to the troops.” Maurice recognises that the army is only as good as its general, and that each general creates the army he deserves by his attitude, disposition and conduct. A general must be “calm in emergencies, prudent in counsel, courteous to his associates.”
• Maurice quotes a saying that “it is better to have an army of deer commanded by a lion than an army of lions commanded by a deer.” For this reason, the general should present a cheerful and unflappable appearance regardless of the situation. Also, a general must set an example by his behaviour “training himself to the highest ideals... and refraining from those things his soldiers should refrain from.”
• “...the general ought not to set himself apart... but he should begin the work and toil along with his troops as much as possible. Such behaviour will lead the soldier to be more submissive to his officers, even if only out of shame, and he will accomplish more.”
• “The general’s way of life should be plain and simple, like that of his soldiers.” Nothing, Maurice writes, is more destructive to an army than a general who likes to live in luxury, as the men will look at the discrepancy between their hardship and the general’s ease and will become corrupt and unscrupulous.
• A general should behave in a “fatherly” way toward his troops, “give orders in a mild manner,” “give advice and discuss essential matters with them in person.” He should be concerned with “their safety, their food and their regular pay.”
• The general must take every measure possible to increase his troops’ confidence and raise their spirits, regardless of reversals.
• Assign people to duties in which they will succeed. Assign cowards and weak officers to rear-echelon duties, and honest and able men to responsible positions, as scouts and line officers. Test the courage of your men before taking them into battle, and if you see their courage failing, take measures to build up their confidence one skill at a time.
• Real motivation comes from expectation of success and rewards, not from fear of punishment. Fear leads to hatred, and severe punishments to mutiny.
• The general must be seen to be a fair and impartial judge in all cases, even between his own people and allies. He must investigate thoroughly and punish mercifully.
• Take proper care of the wounded and the dead, or the army will not fight well.
Responsible Leadership:
• A general should “see that civilians are left unharmed.” Maurice’s regulations are quite strict about any harm done to the property of a Roman citizen. This implies that the leader must take responsibility for the broader impact of his organisation on the people and society.
• Take time making plans. Once you have made a decision, carry it out immediately.
• Gravitas: avoid undue elation and depression.
• A general should take habitual precautions, such as making fortified camps, even when he thinks he is safe; too many military and political leaders in recent memory have given the excuse that Maurice tells a general not to give: we didn’t expect it. A general is responsible for expecting any reasonably foreseeable reversal.
• There are rules in war for a reason. Treat enemy envoys well, and keep sworn agreements. If both sides can agree on these principles, they can function to the advantage of both. Betray them, and they’re closed forever.
• Every night, a general should think about his mistakes and omissions of the day, and what he will do to correct them the next day.
The Path of the General:
• “The best general is not the man of noble family, but the man who can take pride in his own deeds.”
• “A general who desires peace must prepare for war.”
• Change up your tactics, especially when they have been working for some time.
• Failing to study the enemy and the possibilities for reversal on the battlefield is the sign of an inept and amateurish general.
Points of Interest:
Maurice was a great believer in tactics, strategy and careful preparation over raw daring or overwhelming force, and thus his attention was focussed on developing leaders who were proficient in such an approach. “Wild animals,” he writes, “are taken by scouting, by nets, by lying in wait, by stalking, by circling around, and by other such strategems rather than by sheer force.”
There are traces everywhere throughout the Strategikon of the painful lessons dealt to the Roman Army by the barbarians in the period we now call Late Antiquity. Maurice’s injunction never to let barbarian allies camp with, get to close to or learn the tactics of the Byzantine Army shows the marks of a very costly lesson well-learned. Likewise, he specifically enjoins careful training of the cavalry and advocates a force consisting mainly of cavalry.
More on the Strategikon later.
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